Protesters outside in the Green Zone. |
Muqtada al-Sadr is a name synonymous with all that was bad in Iraq shortly after the 2003 US led invasion. His violent, but failed attempts to impose an Islamic theocracy on Iraq through his Mehdi army led him to become one of the coalitions deadliest enemies during the insurgency.
Muqtada al-Sadr |
Sadr comes from one of Iraq's most prominent religious families that can trace it's ancestry all the way back to the Prophet Muhammad. His father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, was one of the leaders of the Hawza, the Shia centre for religious seminaries and scholarship and was eventually gunned down (probably on the orders of Saddam Hussein) along with two of Muqtada's brothers in 1999, after which Muqtada took up the family mantle and began preaching against the US and Israel in his sermons, but nevertheless remained under close scrutiny by Hussein's security forces.
Inside the Parliament building protesters wave Iraqi flags. |
During the civil war (2006-2008) his militiamen were involved in some of the worst sectarian violence, but after a split in the Sadrist movement between the armed militia and the social strand of the party and a subsequent political defeat to Maliki's Sunni-led coalition, al-Sadr left for self-imposed exile in Iran.
However, since his return to Iraq in 2011 al-Sadr seems to have altered, if not softened his approach. The anti-US rhetoric has largely disappeared and he has adopted a less sectarian stance with his Shi'ia militiamen even fighting alongside Sunni tribesman against ISIS. Whilst many in Iraq still doubt his motives and cannot believe the change of heart he appears to have undergone, the aggressive tones of before seem to have largely evaporated and, as if to highlight the change, he responded to accusations of corruption within his party by removing the offending individuals, including getting rid of own Deputy Prime Minister Baha Araji in order to fully cleanse the Sadrist party of any lingering corruption allegations.
Perhaps an indication that al-Sadr may have undergone a change of heart and tactic is that upon entering the parliament building (this weekend) his Sadrist followers, were joined by Sunni's and Kurd's who waved Iraqi flags, not guns, with al-Sadr urging them not to harm anyone or cause damage of any description. The same was true outside in the Green Zone where the protests were gun free and largely peaceful, with none of the violence and Sectarian disruption that have been a trademark of Iraqi demonstrations until now.
As to whether al-Sadr can be a unifying force for good in Iraq is yet to be seen. Many, like al-Maliki, plainly believe 'leopards don't change their spots' and do not trust al-Sadr or his new found sense of Iraqi pride and nationalism. But al-Sadr himself, seems to want to work with al-Abadi, and unlike Maliki does not want the dissolution of the government, but is pushing the Prime Minister to complete his cabinet re-shuffle and get on with the business of governing.
However, in Erbil, in Kurdish controlled Iraq, they appear to have run out patience with the chaotic turns in Baghdad. Yesterday Mala Bakhtiar, a leading PUK politician, called for the Iraqi government to 'recognise the Kurdistan people's undisputed right' to a referendum that would allow the Kurds the right to self-determination, a right guaranteed under the Iraqi constitution.
Bakhtiar continued saying, 'the fragmented and indecent governance (in Baghdad) over the past 13 years has hardly been the answer to the plight of the people of Iraq,' with Kurdish President, Masoud Barzani, confirming that he would hold the referendum before the end of 2016.
Similarly Iraq's Sunni minority also doubt the direction of the government with many still suffering anti-Baathist abuse and persecution that is a long-lasting hangover form the days of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party when the Sunni minority ruled the country. More than a decade later, with many of their religious and political leaders dead, the Sunni's still endure grave human rights abuses (ref: Amnesty Int'l Report; The State of the World's Human Rights 2014/15) often known to be committed by government backed Shi'ia militias, such as the PMF (Popular Mobilisation Forces). Perhaps as a consequence in some cities, such as Mosul, which prior to the ISIS takeover was a Sunni stronghold, many are now in sympathy with the ISIS cause, something which complicates the situation yet further.
Whilst al-Abadi has paid lip service to the Sunni cause by offering government positions to some high-ranking Sunni's, their roles were in fact paper houses designed to appease rather than shelter the Sunni minority.
This fractious and fraught situation is made more complex still by the demands of the US-led coalition fighting against ISIS, whose priority is the destruction of the terrorist group with Iraqi political security and stability coming a poor second to what they see as the primary cause to hand. This, combined with falling global oil prices, high unemployment, endemic corruption and a youth bulge, which has left ~40% of the population under the age of 15, all point to the immediate and pressing problems facing al-Abadi.
However, the weak position that al-Abadi finds himself in has been unexpectedly strengthened by al-Sadr's apparent support which may yet prove to be an effective 'counter-balance' against such undemocratic and corrupt forces as Maliki, and could well prove to be a unifying for good in Iraq. As to whether the coalition forces would accept, and indeed be able to work with someone like al-Sadr in a position of influence is another question, but for the moment he seems to be moving in a positive and peaceful direction, even if it doesn't concur completely with what Western ideas of what a future Iraq should look like.
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