Wednesday, 13 April 2016

Iraq: Endemic Corruption, a failing Government and Sectarian divides.

Today Arutz Sheva7, the national broadcasting service of Israel, reports that the Iraqi government is close to collapse after a sit-in by over 100 MP's demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister, President and parliamentary speaker after their failure to implement government reforms that had been proposed and unanimously carried by the parliament in August last year.  Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, had promised sweeping reforms to the nations Administration, Service industries (e.g. electricity and water supply), the economic and Financial sectors, as well as the activation of an Anti-Corruption Council that was supposed to tackle corruption in whatever sphere, that would be chaired by none other than, the PM himself.

No conflict of interest there then!

However, political commentators, such as Anthony Cordesman at CSIS (the Centre for Strategic & International Studies), doubted the efficacy of al-Abadi's proposals and whether they could actually be implemented given the huge problems that exist in Iraq.  The proposals were vague and undefined in many instances, with Cordesman suggesting that al-Abadi may struggle to get the internal backing necessary to bring the reforms to fruition, and that they were merely interim measures designed to pacify critics of the regime, both from within Iraq and those of the international community.

The proposed measures were aimed broadly at the implementation of a technocratic government that would be more representative of the various sectarian communities within Iraq and would be composed of individuals (appointed by al-Abadi himself) who had demonstrated sufficient 'competence and integrity' to warrant their appointment, together with the expulsion of others who did not possess the 'required conditions' (as above) to fulfil their duties adequately.  Government ministries were to be slimmed down or even abolished, with corrupt or inept officials being dismissed, all with the stated aim of increasing government 'efficiency and reducing costs.'  There were additional measures said to tackle tax evasion, custom tariffs at borders and a retrospective restructuring of officials pensions, both past and present.  Economic reforms included the activation of loans to sectors such as housing, industry and agriculture that were meant to create employment and increase investment from the private sector.

However, all these grand ideas were not backed up with any specifics as to how, when or with what resources they were to be achieved and, as Cordesman said, they did not have any clearly stated 'goals and priorities.'

Further measures aimed at identifying failures in the delivery of services, such as water and electricity, and to rectify said failures, were perhaps, the most opaque of all stating that competency here was the required idyll at both ministry and local government levels, but with no specifics as to how such competency was to be achieved.  Anti-corruption measures were to include the activation of various 'regulatory institutions' who were to identify 'corrupt officials' and establish a 'criteria for evaluating the performance' of officials in order to 'consolidate them (i.e. their particular offices) and increase their efficiency.'

But nowhere in the (I think) relatively short list of proposed reforms is there any mention of how Iraq was to deal with any of the core issues (as Cordesman calls them) facing the nation.  For example, no mention was made of how to deal the problems posed by ISIS, the Iraqi Kurds and the Sunni minority, all which adversely affect the security, profitability and future prospects of a nation whose largest demographic is now under the age of 14 (c.40%; CIA estimates made in 2014 and taken from CIA factfile).

Further to this in February this year Iraqi law-maker, Mishaan al-Jubouri, appeared on satellite TV to admit to blatant corruption, saying that he himself had received bribes amounting to a 'few million dollars' in order to facilitate the closure of corruption cases, where he actually kept the money but didn't (he says) close the cases.  Furthermore, he went on to state unequivocally that 'the whole government is corrupt, including me,' and that everyone in 'the ruling political class is involved in corruption' and that the Commission of Integrity, set up by al-Abadi to investigate corruption, open cases against officials only to shut them down again once a sufficiently large bribe had been paid over.  He couldn't, however, tell the whole story on TV because if he did then he said his life would be forfeit, and that his motivation for going on TV had been to bring the corruption debate into the public forum and to take it our of the hands of the judiciary.  But perhaps the most damning indictment of the regime was when he stated that 'we (the) politicians are behind Iraq's destruction' and were to blame for 'every hungry child' and every Iraqi 'who dies for the lack of medicine.'

Whatever the future holds for Iraq and it's hapless, war-weary populous, one thing is for sure; that the strife will continue to roll and roll on.  There is no simple answer, no one solution that will adequately and succinctly solve the seemingly endless list of problems facing the Iraqi nation.  Cordesman suggests that the US should use it influence more wisely.  The absence of a grand strategy on behalf of the US, was and remains a major flaw that is, at least in part, responsible for the chaos that ensues today.  However, the problems run much deeper and go back much further than even the first Gulf war and today these outstanding issues (such as those mentioned above) present major obstacles to the future prosperity of not just Iraq, but the Middle east as a whole.  Sectarian divides run deep all over the region and Islamic extremism (including the Salafist philosophies espoused by ISIS) are running riot.  It is going to need much more than an end to the various wars to put this region back together.  Aid agencies too should shoulder their part of the blame.  Cordesman recommends that (financial) aid should be withheld until it can be demonstrated that it can be delivered wholesale to it's intended recipients and that it will not simply evaporate into the pockets of yet more corrupt officials.

The situation is horribly complex and intricate, fraught with moral and ethnic potholes that are inevitably laced with sectarian incendiaries that threaten to ignite the current levels of civil strife within Iraq into full blown civil war, that would further inflame the already heightened tensions and stresses across the region.  The problem is not one that can be solved by the Iraqi's alone; the international community, aid agencies and neighbouring countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, even Iran, must all play their part.  But this should be done honestly, openly and without the sectarian, racist prejudices that currently rack the region if we are ever see the end of all this chaos and emerge from the other side peaceably and intact.

Whatever, whoever your God is....have a good and a tolerant day.

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