Barack Obama's (final?) visit to the Middle East ended yesterday when he flew out of Riyadh leaving behind more public uncertainty as to where US-Saudi relations lie than there has been for many years. That the US is not entirely happy with how the relationship has developed over the past few years is no great secret, but where it goes from here is yet to be determined.
Saudi Arabia has a Sunni majority that largely follow the Wahhabi traditions, including various aspects of Sharia Law, that are seen in the West as being extreme and oppressive. Public executions, female suffrage and oppression, the political suppression of rivals and a lack of freedom of expression are just some of the violations levelled at the Saudi's and that many believe should form a pre-requisite part of any future negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the US.
Similarly, the Saudi governments very public support of Sisi's coup and the ensuing violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, culminating in the massacre of Brotherhood supporters in August 2013, as well as their apparent indifference to the initial rise of ISIS, also caused much unease and disquiet in the West at the time.
For their part, the Arab Spring and Muslim Brotherhood led 'uprisings' across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region led to considerable wariness among the ruling Saudi families. The apparent abandonment of Mubarak by the US in Egypt in the wake of Morsi's revolution, increased that unease yet further. Fearing a similar popular uprising in Saudi, and worries that the US might also turn their back on their long-term 'friend,' either through a lack of (US led) political will or an inability to act, placed further strain on the already shaky US-Saudi relationship.
After years of tacit support and political indifference to the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi, the organisation was designated a terrorist organisation in March 2014; banning of the 'four finger' salute (in support of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood) and a crackdown on the use social media, as well as the closing down of publishing houses who had shown support for Morsi and other groups who had been critical of Saudi government policies and the Wahhabi traditions, did not sit well with Human Rights groups and the West in general.
However, Saudi support for the Syrian revolution and their initial indifference towards ISIS changed when they no longer saw these as 'Sunni' uprisings (to be encouraged) against the geopolitical expansionist aims of Iranian backed 'Shia' extremism and realised that they (ISIS) had territorial ambitions of their own. ISIS proclamation of their Caliphate 2014 and their subsequent denouncement of the Saudi regime caused a rapid realignment of Saudi policy, especially following a spate of attacks inside the kingdom that had targeted Saudi security forces and the Shiite minority in the East of the country. However, since it was believed that the attacks had been perpetrated by Saudi Sunni's aligned with ISIS, some still questioned the degree of support there was within the government (for ISIS) as well as their ability (or willingness) to protect their own Shia minority (see Further reading below).
Some sympathy for ISIS within Saudi may still be present since it is believed that several thousand (if not more) Saudi's had joined the organisation and it is this that may cause some to doubt in the US as to the voracity of the Saudi regime's desire to combat ISIS.
In Yemen, the rapid advances made by the Iranian backed Shia Houthi's also increased the disquiet of the Saudi government. The subsequent collapse of the Yemeni government, accompanied by the growth of Al-Quaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) led to the formation of the US-GB-Saudi coalition which began bombing targets inside Yemen in March 2015. However, in this the respective motives of the coalition partners differed greatly, with the Saudi's concentrating their bombing campaign on largely Houthi targets, who they perceived as the major threat against Saudi authority, whilst the US preferred a more balanced attack against both the Houthi's and AQAP.
Speaking yesterday at Brookings Institute in Washington, Senator Chris Murphy detailed how this difference in political will between the Saudi's and the US with regard to their respective threats in Yemen, threatened to undermine the effectiveness of the campaign. This fundamental difference in their respective military priorities has led many to question the nature of the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia with analysts and commentators on both sides calling for a reassessment of where the land currently lies.
Some have also questioned whether US influence in the region is waning, though as Senator Murphy pointed out, there is a certain degree of hubris among many Americans who have perhaps overstated the level of influence that the US may, or may not, have maintained in the past. That the relationship needs over-hauling is not, I think, in question and to that end I found Senator Murphy's views more balanced and realistic than many I've heard. In fact he has introduced a Bill to Congress (H.J. Res. 90) that proposes some very specific changes to the existing relationship between the two nations with particular emphasis on the future supply of armaments. Furthermore, Senator Murphy is pushing for a 'more progressive foreign policy' for the US that (I think) is much more likely to bear fruit than the existing policies that are plainly failing in MENA.
Whether the peace talks in Kuwait next week on the future of Yemen result in any concrete proposals and peaceful solutions is yet to be determined, but the signs do look hopeful. But Yemen aside, the MENA region is awash with conflicts, be they the result of political, sectarian, or other differences. The situation in Syria particularly is complicated further by Russia's backing of Assad who, Putin insists, must be a part of the (eventual?) political solution for the nation. Putin's and, by proxy, Russia's motivation for supporting Assad is clouded and undefined, though is thought to be a desire to limit the rise of Sunni extremism in the region (see Foreign Affairs publication, The Arab Spring at 5) which he fears may spill over into the Caucasus and beyond into Russia's many Sunni Muslim communities (witness Putin's ruthless and bloody put down of the largely Sunni uprising in Chechnya which he does not wish repeated elsewhere). However, this runs contrary to the interests of the US led coalition in Syria and of course, the Sunni majority of Saudi Arabia, but parallel to the possible expansionist plans of Shiite Iran.
That ISIS remains a threat to all in the region is largely agreed, but the degree of motivation to rid the world of ISIS varies hugely amongst the various military and/or sectarian factions who are fighting them. Which, in a roundabout way, brings us back to US-Saudi relations and the inherent problem therein. The US wish to see the back of what they view as the major security threats to America; namely AQAP (who the Senator yesterday detailed may be able to muster some sort of nuclear threat sooner rather than later against the US) and ISIS, who are viewed as a secondary threat to US homeland (by comparison), but nevertheless represent a significant threat to the stability of MENA and, in a wider context, to the stability of Europe. The Saudi's however, are primarily motivated to counter Shiite extremism and Iranian backed terrorism across the region, with the joint threats of ISIS and AQAP not perhaps being seen as such immediate threats to their own sovereignty and future stability.
With these inherent differences in the policy aims of the US and Saudi Arabia it is perhaps, not surprising that any attempts at trying to unify them will inevitably run into difficulties at times. But that's not to say that the differences are insurmountable, because they are not. On both sides there will (I suggest) always be some degree of mistrust simply because the two approaches come from such vastly different beginnings. But I do believe that there is enough goodwill and pragmatism on both sides to see the current difficulties through provided each takes the time to try and understand each other's respective views and to temper their expectations accordingly.
Have a good day!
Further reading:
http://www.brookings.edu/ Rethinking Political Islam series
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ The Arab Spring at Five
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